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Introduction
Science education has always been considered to be one of the best tools 
for cultivating students’ minds. Scientifi c activities such as conducting 
empirical research, designing and executing experiments, gaining results 
from observations and building theories are seen as those in need of the 
most systematic forms of reasoning. The fact that a deep understanding 
of complex scientifi c theories requires well-developed reasoning skills 
leads to the assumption that teaching sciences at school will improve 
students’ thinking skills as well. It probably did in the case of a few stu-
dents who really deeply understood science, but for the majority this 
assumption did not work mainly because the science was set too far in 
advance of students’ current cognitive capability so they were unable to 
engage in it fruitfully.
The argument that learning sciences facilitates the development of 
thinking was one of the justifi cations for extending the proportion of sci-
ence in school curricula. However, the rapid growth of scientifi c data and 
their distillation into school curricula often resulted in large quantities of 
disciplinary content that students were not able to process and under-
stand. Until the second half of the twentieth century, the lack of adequate 
psychological theories or of evidence-based methods of assessing the 
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effects of science education made it impossible to fulfi l the ambitious 
goals of systematically improving students’ reasoning skills.
The gap between the level of abstraction, complexity and organisation 
of teaching materials on the one hand, and students’ actual cognitive 
development on the other can be narrowed in two ways. One side of the 
solution is that teaching materials should be better adjusted to students’ 
psychological and developmental characteristics. This requires more in-
formation on students’ actual developmental level and individualized 
teaching methods to support students’ progress. The other side of the 
solution is accelerating students’ cognitive development in order to elevate 
their level of reasoning to the requirements of the learning tasks. Re-
search has shown that development can be stimulated by specifi c activities 
and exercises, and learning science offers a number of effi cient opportu-
nities to accelerate students’ cognitive development (Adey & Shayer, 
1994). Systematic monitoring of the development of students’ reasoning 
skills may facilitate both directions of this adjustment (Glynn, Yeany & 
Britton, 1991).
In this chapter, fi rst we summarise the results of psychological and 
educational research concerning cognitive development related to science 
education. Next, we systematically describe what thinking processes 
might be developed in science education. Then we illustrate the possi-
bilities by introducing some of those methods which utilise these results 
in science education and aim at more effi cient training of students’ thinking 
processes and fi nally discuss how these thinking processes can best be 
measured, diagnosed and monitored in order to support teaching and 
learning.
Reasoning in Science: Cognitive Development 
in an Educational Context
Science Reasoning and General Reasoning
Is scientifi c thinking special? That is, is scientifi c thinking distinctly dif-
ferent from thinking in other subject areas? Obviously, there are some 
special characteristics, but to what extent are these simply particular 
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expressions of the human ability to process information in general? Human 
cognition and the accumulation of experiences are often comparred to 
the process of scientifi c research and discovery. However, although there 
are broad analogies between the logic of scientifi c research and human 
reasoning, there are some signifi cant differences as well (Howson & 
Urbach, 1996; Johnson-Laird, 2006). One of the major differences stems 
from the developmental nature of human cognition. Humans reach their 
actual reasoning capacity through a long developmental process, which 
is shaped by the stimuli and information one has received and processed. 
Although science has also reached its current form through a long develop-
mental process, the logical system that children are expected to compre-
hend is a stable constant structure, while children attempting to master it 
may be in different developmental stages.
Certainly Jean Piaget and his co-workers regarded scientifi c thinking as 
representative of general intellectual processing, or general intelligence. 
During investigations of children’s development of thinking from infancy 
to adolescence, they used practical tasks such as ordering things by size, 
ex ploring conservation, cause and effect, control of variables and prob-
ability (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget & Inhelder, 1974, 1976), all 
of which would be easily recognised by mathematics and science teach-
ers as central to their subject areas. He drew conclusions about cognitive 
development in general from children’s performance in these apparently 
scientifi c tasks. Also, typical non-verbal tests on general intelligence 
such as Raven’s Matrices (Raven, 1960) or the Calvert Non-verbal test 
(Calvert, 1986) tap into subjects’ ability to use inductive and deductive 
reasoning which is the basis of a much scientifi c thinking.
On the whole, this extrapolation from scientifi c thinking to thinking in 
general has received some empirical support. Although the general stages 
of cognitive development described by Piaget are expressed in scientifi c 
terms, their descriptions in terms of concrete operations or abstract rea-
son ing are easily applied across all forms of learning. Furthermore, as 
we will describe later in this chapter, training in scientifi c thinking has 
been shown to transfer to higher levels of achievement in remote subject 
areas such as native or second language learning (Csapó & Nikolov, 
2009) suggesting, at least, an intimate link between science reasoning 
and reasoning in general.
Notwithstanding such evidence it is possible to make some distinction 
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between scientifi c thinking and ‘good’ thinking in general. Consider this 
list of general thinking skills (from McGuinness, 2005):
(1)  pattern-making through analysing wholes/parts and similarities/
differences;
(2) making predictions and justifying conclusions;
(3) reasoning about cause and effect;
(4) generating ideas and possibilities;
(5) seeing multiple perspectives;
(6) solving problems and evaluating solutions;
(7) weighing up pros and cons;
(8) making decisions.
The fi rst three have ready expressions within science. The fourth, that 
is, generating ideas, is certainly important in science, but – in a different 
guise – it is also central to artistic and literary creation. The fi fth – seeing 
multiple perspectives – may be necessary at the frontiers of science 
for trying to integrate apparently confl icting models (e.g., wave-particle 
duality). However, at school level it is not as typical of science as it 
would be of, say, history, social studies or drama where high level think-
ing includes the ability to see events from a number of different perspec-
tives. It may also be imbued with an emotional load (can I see the view-
point of my enemy?) which is, at least theoretically, less common in 
scientifi c thinking. Notwithstanding, it may be important in teaching: 
teachers should often try to observe a phenomenon from a child’s point 
of view in order to understand the way children reason and that they 
draw conclusions differently in comparison with an expert. The last three 
are certainly very general and apply far beyond the boundaries of the 
sciences. In particular ‘solving problems’ is something of a catch-all 
phrase which can embrace many activities. When, as within PISA frame-
works, the idea of complex problem solving is well-characterised (OECD, 
2003), it is seen as much broader than a scientifi c ability.
On this argument science education seems to have less to offer in the 
development of general reasoning ability. Yet, our fi nal conclusion on the 
debate about the generality-specifi city of thinking must rest on the model 
of intelligence that is adopted. If each of the thinking skills is relatively 
independent of one another, then each needs to be developed in its own 
right. On the basis of this model, it is possible to conceive of an indi-
vidual who scores high on reasoning about cause and effect but low on 
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decision-making. The alternative is to regard each of the individual 
thinking skills as expressions of a general underlying intelligence. In this 
case, work on developing a sub-set of whichever list of thinking skills 
we happen to favour should have some transfer effects to those skills not 
explicitly trained. 
Elsewhere, (Adey, Csapó, Demetriou, Hautamäki, & Shayer, 2007) we 
have argued that there is indeed a general intelligence, which is amenable 
to educational infl uence offering a potential mechanism by which think-
ing abilities may be transferred from those trained to others. This model 
also posits that ‘on top’ of this general processor (g) there exist a set of 
specialised structural systems (Demetriou, 1993) which allow for a limi-
ted independent variation of different areas of thinking (e.g., quantitative-
relational, spatial). A critical feature of this model is that the develop-
ment of the specialised systems is both limited by and is the route into 
the development of the general intellectual processor and its executive 
control (self-regulation). We believe that there is substantial empirical 
evidence which is compatible with this model and that it offers a fruitful 
basis for educational action and for the analysis offered in this chapter.
Learning and Development
Discussing the problem of development in educational context it is ne-
cessary to clarify its relationship to learning. The distinction between 
‘learning’ and ‘development’ is one about which Vygotsky was exercised 
at some length. Vygotsky thinks that formal education in one specifi c 
domain defi nitely infl uences development in other domains of knowl-
edge by a sort of generalisation process… (Tryphon & Vonèche, 1996. p. 
6). Indeed, the whole idea of the Zone of Proximal Development can be 
seen as Vygotsky’s attempt to explain the relationship between learning 
and development. 
Although we cannot make a sharp distinction between the two concepts, 
it may be possible to characterise extreme (stereotypical) examples of 
each term. At the limits, one thinks of ‘learning’ in relation to content 
matter and the acquisition of simple knowledge such as the correct spell-
ings of words or multiplication tables, whilst ‘development’ relates to 
functions which unfold during a process of maturation, minimally or not 
22
Philip Adey and Benő Csapó
at all infl uenced by the environment. Development is an organic process; 
a certain stage is based on the previous ones.
Of course, in reality there can be no such thing as ‘pure’ examples of 
learning or development in these stereotypical terms – learning uninfl u-
enced by development, or development uninfl uenced by experience. 
Erron eous belief in such stereotypes is at the root of much misunder-
standing in education, for example, cognitive development or the unfold-
ing of intelligence is entirely under the control of time and heredity, or 
that the acquisition of concepts requires only suffi cient effort of learning 
regardless of their inherent complexity.
This problem may be illustrated by an example taken from mathemat-
ics education. Hungarian students learn how to convert hours into min-
utes, meters into millimetres etc. by the fourth grade with considerable 
effort of memorising the rules and mechanically exercising the conver-
sion operations. Then, they pass to the next chapters of curriculum, learn-
ing of conversion ends, and they begin to forget what they have learnt. 
Their proportional reasoning is at a lower developmental level at that 
age, and learning rules of conversion has a little impact on it. Later, on the 
other hand, by the seventh grade they can convert measures again quite 
well, as it is a specifi c application of proportional reasoning that reaches 
a higher developmental level by that time (Csapó, 2003).
Several empirical studies demonstrated that learning sciences does not 
result necessarily in better scientifi c reasoning. For example, Bao et al. 
compared Chinese and American university students’ physics knowledge 
and scientifi c reasoning. They have found that although Chinese students 
performed much better on the science knowledge test (attributable to 
their more demanding high school science studies), their performance on 
the science reasoning test was similar to that of their American peers 
(Bao et al., 2009).
It is more useful to see learning and development as lying at either 
ends of a spectrum, with the simple acquisition of knowledge at the L-end 
(but still dependent to some extent on the individual’s level of maturity) 
and the development of general intelligence at the D-end (but still ame-
nable to educational stimulus). The acquisition of complex concepts (e.g., 
photosynthesis or multiple causes of historical events) lies part way 
along the L-D-spectrum since they develop in complexity in an individ-
ual over many years while being strongly under the infl uence of learning 
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experiences. As far as this chapter is concerned, the development of sci-
entifi c reasoning is another example of a process which depends on both 
the development of the central nervous system (the individual’s capacity 
to process complex ideas) and appropriate learning experiences. High-
level learning cannot take place without development, and satisfactory 
cognitive development cannot occur without appropriate cognitive stim-
ulation (learning experiences).
A feature of this Learning-Development-spectrum worth noting is that 
the generality of functions increase as one moves from L to D. At the 
L-end information learnt tends to be specifi c and applicable to a narrow 
range of cognitive functioning. Learning the number of a bus for a par-
ticular route is not knowledge that generalises usefully to other contexts. 
On the other hand, educational experiences which stimulate the develop-
ment of general intelligence may be expected to have an impact on the 
effectiveness of all learning, in any intellectual fi eld (and maybe beyond).
The model of a plastic general intelligence proposed here, that is, a 
general thinking machinery amenable to educational infl uence, has im-
plications for the whole nature of education. We will return to the ques-
tion of how science educators can use this model to provide general 
cognitive stimulation for their students, but now we must consider in 
more detail some different types of thinking in science which might form 
the ‘subject matter’ of a strand in the curriculum devoted to the develop-
ment of scientifi c – and by the way, general – thinking. 
A System of Thinking Processes That Should Be 
Developed in Science Education
The processes of thinking have been studied, described and categorised 
in several psychological and educational research traditions. These ap-
proaches often used different theoretical frameworks, terminologies and 
methods. Among these is the psychometric approach (intelligence re-
search, individual differences approaches, factor analytic studies) which 
produced a great amount of data of the general cognitive abilities and 
also contributed signifi cantly to the development of psychological testing 
and educational assessment (Carroll, 1993).
Piaget and his colleagues emphasised the developmental aspects of 
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cognition, and described the development of thinking through qualita-
tively different stages. Piaget’s work is especially important for science 
education as his theory explains the origin of reasoning schemes and 
makes a connection between the manipulation of external objects and the 
development of higher-order thinking skills. His work has been followed 
by several Neo-Piagetian researches proposing a number of elaborated 
models of cognitive development and systems of thinking (e.g., Demetriou, 
2004). Piaget’s theory and the researches of his followers are especially 
important for establishing early science education, organising observa-
tions and experiments to be carried out by children.
The information processing approach emphasised the differences be-
tween novices and experts in the organisation of knowledge. It offers 
useful models of learning within the content domains, but developmental 
aspects and reasoning processes are less elaborated in the information 
processing paradigm. The most recent cognitive neuroscience research 
studies thinking from another aspect. Its results are not ready for direct 
application in the fi eld of science education, but the main messages of 
the results for education are promising: they confi rm the claim of the plasti-
city of the brain and the modifi ability of cognitive processes, especially 
during the early phases of the development (Adey, Csapó, Demetriou, 
Hautamäki, & Shayer, 2007).
For assessing scientifi c reasoning we may provide a framework from 
all these research traditions. However, taking the developmental aspects, 
the target age groups and the diagnostic orientation into account the 
Piagetian tradition offers the most useful resources.
There are very many ways in which the cake that we call ‘thinking’ 
may be sliced up. In the next section we will fi rst look at a couple of meta-
strategies for thinking about thinking, then consider a number of quite 
general classes of thinking, and then of dichotomies. Finally, we will 
focus on a specifi c set of ‘reasoning patterns’ which have particular rel-
evance to science. 
Meta-Strategies and General Thinking Processes
Human thinking, in broader practice is never a simple mechanical process. 
It is always infl uenced by the actual situation and context as well as the 
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general psychological state of the thinker. Even scientifi c thinking is 
often mediated at least at the level of general thinking processes by non-
cognitive factors such as motivation, interest and curiosity. Forming 
science-related attitudes and values may be an important goal of science 
education, as is the development of beliefs related to the validity of sci-
entifi c knowledge and the way students think about the status of their 
own knowledge (personal epistemologies). We will not deal with the af-
fective aspects of learning science in detail in this chapter, but here at the 
outset we have to mention the possible connection between cognitive 
and affective processes.
Meta-strategies relate to a person’s control over their own thinking 
process. To some extent they are dispositional but they regulate the 
whole process of thinking including attention and the choice of deploy-
ment of one or another specifi c types of thinking. There are several re-
search directions which deal with these questions. Meta-cognition is the 
broadest concept; beyond its importance in scientifi c reasoning it plays 
an important role in reading comprehension and mathematical problem 
solving as well (Csíkos, 2007). These meta-strategies are essential in 
learning sciences, especially in understanding and mastering complex 
scientifi c concepts and ideas.
There are some general thinking processes that are characteristic of 
some contexts and situations, such as argumentation and critical think-
ing. It is worth briefl y defi ning them here as well.
Storage and Retrieval
Knowledge about the processes of remembering, also called meta-mem-
ory, is more specifi c than the general processes of self-regulation. These 
are skills that can be learnt enhancing the thinker’s ability to transfer 
information to and from long-term memory. As human memory stores 
organised information more effi ciently than independent pieces of infor-
mation, information should be arranged into compact structures before 
memorising. If the knowledge has a natural structure the best way is to 
make this structure explicit and the related pieces of information should 
be memorised by integrating them into this structure. If a unifying struc-
ture does not exist, the learner has to create an artifi cial one and integrate 
the information into it. For example, a well-known strategy is associating 
a list of words to be memorised with the parts of a popular building or 
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the houses of a familiar street (method of places). Students with good 
memorising abilities are able to distinguish between well-structured 
learning materials when exploring and understanding may result in 
meaningful conceptual learning, from unstructured information where 
creating artifi cial structures may be a better strategy. Storage and re-
trieval strategies were already studied by Greek philosophers and special 
techniques (also referred to as mnemotechnics) were further developed 
by the Roman orators.
Self Regulation 
This means the ability to attend to the relevant parts of a problem, to 
analyse personal reasoning and monitor one’s own choice of thinking 
pathways, progress towards a solution and detection of errors and dead-
ends. Self regulation includes motivational and other affective aspects as 
well (Molnár, 2002).
Argumentation (Dialogic)
Dialogic argumentation identifi es disagreement among assertions, relates 
supporting and refuting evidence to each assertion, and weighs all of the 
evidence “in an integrative evaluation of the relative merit of the oppos-
ing views” (Kuhn, 1992, p. 157). Argumentation plays a relevant role in 
the advancement of science by checking errors and identifying insuffi -
cient evidence. Argumentation requires organising statements into a log-
ical order. It is a basic reasoning process in presenting the results of a 
research, but its potential is not yet fully exploited in science education 
(Osborne, 2010).
Critical Thinking
Critical thinking belongs to those forms of thinking which are most fre-
quently mentioned both inside and outside the school context. Its im-
provement is frequently proposed, recently due to the explosion of easily 
accessible information. One often has to select and classify information 
and has to evaluate its relevance and validity and has to judge the credibi-
lity of its sources. At the same time, defi nitions of critical thinking are ge-
ner ally diffi cult to operationalise. The core of critical thinking is usually 
identifi ed as the ability of collecting, organising and evaluating inform-
ation. 
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Most interpretations describe critical thinking as a set of a number of 
component abilities, and the long lists of components usually include 
every important form of thinking. The most frequently mentioned attri-
butes of critical thinkers are openness, the intention of checking the reli-
ability of information sources, assessing the foundation and validity of 
conclusions, evaluating the quality of arguments and the ability of ques-
tioning (Norris & Ennis, 1989; Ennis, 1995).
If we look for the distinctiveness of critical thinking, the feature that 
makes it more than the sum of its components, we fi nd it the way the 
process of thinking is organised and in its purpose. There is always a 
strong critical attitude behind a critical thinking act that motivates the 
thinker to question a given bit of information, statement, model, theory, 
chain of arguments etc. Thinking processes mobilised by critical atti-
tudes play an essential role in the advancement of science, especially in 
evaluating results, judging evidence, fi ltering out sources of errors, and 
falsifying unjustifi ed statements. Preparing critical analyses and reviews 
is one of the characteristic activities of the researcher. Science education 
offers an effi cient fi eld for practising critical thinking as the validity of 
arguments may be judged on the basis of objective criteria.
Dichotomies
Some forms of thinking relevant to science may be characterised by di-
chotomies, introduced briefl y in this section. In few of the following 
pairs there is not any question of one being ‘better’ than the other. In all 
except the case of concrete-abstract, the highest level of thinking in-
volves an integration of both types, or a choice of the most appropriate 
type for a particular situation.
Quantitative – Qualitative
Quantitative reasoning is characterised by situations where the learner 
must apply properties and procedures related to number sense and num-
ber operations to solve the given problem. Qualitative thinking focuses 
more on the nature of the variables and judgement for the purpose of 
comparison or prioritising. In most complex problem-solving situations 
both quantitative and qualitative reasoning need to be employed.
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Concrete – Abstract
Concrete thinking is restricted to actual objects, words, or numbers and 
simple relationships between them. It allows for simple mathematical 
manipulation, classifi cation and simple causal relationships. Abstract 
thinking allows for the imaginary manipulation of factors in a hypo-
thetical model or the possibility of understanding complex relationships 
such as when there are multiple interacting causes and multiple interact-
ing effects. In this case, there is a clear hierarchy with abstract thinking 
being far more powerful than concrete thinking. As from abstract con-
structs further abstract ones can be created, understanding complex sys-
tems may require the comprehension of several levels of abstraction. 
Science offers an excellent context for developing abstraction skills and 
for demonstrating the concrete-abstract relationship and levels of ab-
straction.
Convergent – Divergent
Convergent reasoning is used in the type of problem which has one cor-
rect answer, so that the reasoning progresses through steps designed to 
reach this one answer. These steps may include the elimination of extra-
neous variables, the combination of others, and operations on given data 
with the aim of reaching the correct solution. Divergent thinking by con-
trast is discursive, exploring a number of solutions, especially to prob-
lems which may have more correct answers. Divergent thinking is also 
characteristic of creativity, ‘thinking outside the box’ and ‘lateral think-
ing’. Complex problems may require both divergent and convergent 
thinking in different phases of their solution.
Wholist – Analyst
The wholist-analytic dichotomy represents a general approach to a prob-
lem or to representing and processing information, also identifi ed as cog-
nitive style (Davies & Graff, 2006). Wholist thinking aims for an over-
view of a situation, to reach a conclusion based on the ‘big picture’ 
rather than the detail. The opposite, analytic approach is to focus on the 
detail and try to solve the problem bit by bit. Analytic thinking is char-
acterised by situations where the learner must apply principles from for-
mal logic in determining necessary and suffi cient conditions or in deter-
mining if implication of causality occurs among the constraints and con-
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ditions provided in the problem stimulus. Excessive wholist thinking 
may miss important details, and excessive analytic thinking may fail to 
integrate the parts of a solution into a coherent response. Both types of 
thinking are useful at appropriate phases of problem-solving. (Note that 
some authors use ‘holist’ rather than wholist.)
Deductive – Inductive
The process of deduction is reasoning from the general to the specifi c or 
from premises to a logically valid conclusion. Examples are: Condi-
tional (deducing a valid conclusion from a rule of the form “if P, then 
Q”); Syllogistic (evaluating whether a conclusion necessarily follows 
from two premises that are assumed to be true) or more generally Propo-
sitional reasoning; and Suppositional (Supposing a possibility for the 
sake of argument, in some cases obtaining a contradiction). Deductive 
reasoning applies strict logical rules. Consequently, appropriate applica-
tion of rules to true premises always results in true conclusions. On the 
other hand, deductive reasoning does not produce originally new knowl-
edge as it expresses in a different form what is there already, although 
often in a hidden way in the premises. Deductive reasoning is essential 
in scientifi c research, errors in a deductive process leading to false con-
clusions. As Piaget’s research demonstrated, children attain a fully devel-
oped formal logical system only after a long developmental process (and 
we may add: if at all), therefore they possess limited tools to compre-
hend deductive argumentation. (For the development of deductive rea-
soning and its relevance for science education, see Vidákovich, 1998).
The process of induction is reasoning from particular facts or indi-
vidual cases to a general conclusion, that is, constructing a general rule 
or explanatory model from a number of specifi c instances. Classically, 
science progresses by a series of inductive and deductive loops, although 
this rather convergent picture omits the intuitive, creative leap that very 
often occurs in real scientifi c advance. From a philosophical point of view, 
accumulation of positive examples may not prove the truth of a theory in 
general, therefore, Popper proposed a more sophisticated theory for ex-
plaining induction that is based on the concept of falsifi cation (Popper, 
1972). Psychological processes of inductive reasoning play signifi cant 
role in understanding science and application of knowledge in new con-
texts (Csapó, 1997, 2001a). Its modifi ability has been demonstrated in a 
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number of training experiments (Hamers, de Koning, & Sijtsma, 1998; 
Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga, Sanz de Acedo Baquedano, & Oliver, 2010. 
Molnár, 2011).
Thinking Patterns, Operations, Abilities
Finally, in this section on taxonomies of thinking we will look at a 
number of specifi c reasoning patterns, or ‘schemata’ which appear to be 
characteristic of scientifi c thinking. A variety of terms have been used as 
comprehensive names for them; for example, patterns, schemes, sche-
mata, operations, skills and abilities. We acknowledge that several terms 
may be appropriate in different contexts; however, we prefer to use think-
ing abilities as the most general term for them. We note again, that we 
consider them as plastic abilities, modifi able by systematic educational 
stimulation.
They vary in the demand they make on intellectual capacity and here 
they are ordered very approximately in terms of their diffi culty. Because 
these abilities are really aspects of general cognitive development, they 
are not amenable to direct instruction, but need to be slowly constructed 
by students in response to maturation and appropriate stimulating experi-
ences.
Piaget and his colleagues studied the development of these reasoning 
operations by observing children’s activities dealing with simple tasks 
related to scientifi c phenomena (see Inhelder, & Piaget, 1958; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1974, 1976). Other researchers studied them by the means of 
mental tests. The development of some of these operations was assessed 
in several projects in Hungary by paper-and-pencil tests (see Csapó, 2003). 
Conservation
For an adult it is obvious that a quantity (of matter, number etc.) remains 
the same if nothing is added or taken away from it. Conservation is the 
result of development appearing at a certain stage. Before it a child does 
not recognise that changing insignifi cant features, e.g., the pouring water 
from one cup into another one with a different shape does not infl uence 
the quantity of the water. Conservation of number (two rows of beads are 
still the same number when one is stretched) is one of the simplest forms 
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of conservation while recognising that a solid displaces an equal volume 
of liquid in which it sinks is more demanding.
Seriation
This means not only putting things in order according to one or more 
properties, but also interpreting a given phenomenon within a series of 
comparable phenomena in order to assign some plausible meaning to it. 
E.g., ordering stimuli along a quantitative dimension, such as length (In-
helder & Piaget, 1958; Nagy, 1987). Seriation is a precondition for sol-
ving more complicated organising tasks, e.g., trying all setting of an ex- 
periment. 
Seriation, in general dealing with relations is an essential feature of 
scientifi c reasoning. Transitivity is a feature of relations frequently nec-
essary to handle. In general, transitivity involves the ability to under-
stand the characteristics of relationships and logically combine two or 
more relations to draw a conclusion. Combining two or more relations 
leads to identifying new or more general relations (Glenda, 1996).
Classification
Classifi cation is the ability to classify objects or ideas as belonging to a 
group and having the characteristics of that group. At its simplest, this 
may demand no more than grouping objects which have just one variable 
with two values. (“Group these red and blue squares so that all in each 
group are the same.”). As the number of variables and values increases 
so does their diffi culty, and extra layers of demand are added by empty 
classes, class inclusion (two classes in which all members of one class 
are included in the other, as in the proposition “All dogs are animals”) 
and two-way classifi cation. (“Lions are mammals within vertebrates 
within animals but they are also carnivores.”) More complex structures 
require multiple classifi cation and hierarchical classifi cation (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958; Nagy, 1987).
Combinatorial Reasoning
Combinatorial reasoning is the process of creating complex constructs 
out of a set of given elements that satisfy the conditions explicitly given 
or inferred from the situation. This is characterised by situations where 
the learner must examine a variety of factors, consider all combinations 
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in which they can appear, evaluate each of these individual combinations 
relative to some objective constraint and then select from or rank the 
combinations into order. If the conditions and constraints allow a larger 
number of constructs, all constructs can be created only if a systematic 
order of enumeration is applied (for a taxonomy of combinatorial opera-
tions, see Csapó, 1988; for developmental data see Csapó, 2001b; Nagy, 
2004). Creating combinations of conditions or values of variables sys-
tematically is often required when designing experiments (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958; Kishta, 1979; Schröder, Bödeker, Edelstein, & Teo, 2000). 
Physical and chemical experiments offer a great number of possibilities 
to exercise combinatorial reasoning by exploring all possible settings 
allowed by the constraints of the equipment and materials. (For the im-
provement of combinatorial reasoning see also Csapó, 2003.)
Analogical Reasoning
Analogical reasoning can be applied in situations where the learner must 
solve a problem with a context similar to a problem the learner is famil-
iar with or includes a problem base which the learner has solved in the 
past. The parameters or the context in the new stimulus material is 
changed, but the driving factors or causal mechanism is the same or 
similar. The learner should be able to solve the new problem by inter-
preting it in the light of past experience with the analogous situation. 
Where the reality and the analogy are both accessible to direct percep-
tion, we refer to this as concrete modelling (for example the notion of 
temperature rising is modelled by the thread of mercury rising in a ther-
mometer) but where either or both are abstraction, it becomes formal 
modelling (relating potential difference to water pressure). Analogical 
reasoning relates two individual objects or phenomena based on their 
structural similarities. Analogical reasoning is one of the basic mecha-
nisms of transfer and the application of knowledge (Klauer, 1989a). 
Finding similarities between more than two objects, and analysing the 
rules of similarities lead to rule induction and inductive reasoning (Polya, 
1968). Analogical reasoning helps understanding new scientifi c phenom-
ena on the basis of already known similar phenomena, as well as applica-
tion of knowledge in new areas. Therefore, learning science offers several 
possibilities of improving analogical reasoning (Nagy, 2006).
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Proportional Reasoning 
Proportional reasoning involves a sense of co-variation and of multiple 
comparisons, and the ability to mentally store and process several pieces 
of information. The co-variation is usually assumed to be linear, but in 
general could be non-linear (e.g., exponential); considering a nonlinear as 
a linear relationship may lead to oversimplifi cation or a serious thinking 
error. Proportionality requires the comparison of two or more ratios 
(Schröder, Bödeker, Edelstein, & Teo, 2000). Proportional reasoning is a 
basic process involved in several more complex analogical and inductive 
forms of reasoning (Csapó, 1997). Understanding some basic scientifi c 
concepts (e.g., speed) requires proportional reasoning, and one of the 
obstacles of understanding school science is the lack of a proper level of 
proportional reasoning (Kishta, 1979). Recent research has also demon-
strated that although proportional reasoning develops over a long period 
(Boyera, Levinea, & Huttenlochera, 2008), it is amenable to training 
(Jitendra et al., 2009).
Extrapolation
Extrapolation enables learners to use the pattern of data from one area to 
predict what will happen in another area. Extrapolation is closely related 
to analogical and inductive reasoning while rules induced from observa-
tion in one area are applied to another area not directly explored. In 
simple cases, extrapolation means extending the scope of relationships 
beyond the range of measured data or creating new data points. In more 
general cases extrapolation requires extending complex rules to new, 
unknown situations. The probability of making errors and invalid extra-
polation increases with the distance between the observed and extrapo-
lated data or rules.
Probabilistic Reasoning
Most scientifi c phenomena as well as events of everyday life depend 
on probability. There is always a certain probability that it is raining in 
a given day; that a team wins a given match; or that the exchange rate of 
a given currency will change. Understanding these phenomena and cal-
culating risks require probabilistic reasoning. Probabilistic inferences are 
based on past events and assumed (or calculated) likelihoods of future 
events. Risk analysis depends on this, and the realisation that one or 
34
Philip Adey and Benő Csapó
several counter examples do not undermine the validity of an established 
probabilistic relationship. Development of probabilistic reasoning was 
studied by Piaget mostly in the context of simple science experiments 
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1975; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008).
Correlational Reasoning
Correlational reasoning means dealing with probabilistic relationships 
when the connection between two features or variables appears only in 
certain number of cases. Depending on the ratio of the appearances, the 
strength of the association may be different. Recognising correlational 
relationships involves observation of cases confi rming and not confi rm-
ing the association, and estimating their ratio (Kuhn, Phelps, & Walters, 
1985; Schröder, Bödeker, Edelstein, & Teo, 2000). As it requires obser-
vations, collecting and processing contradicting information, mastering 
correlational reasoning is seldom complete, and its failures may lead to 
doubtful judgements (Bán, 1998). Research has shown that it develops 
slowly (Lawson, 1982; Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer, & Nett, 2005), but it 
can be improved with systematic instruction, especially in science (Lawson, 
Adi, & Karplus, 1979; Ross & Cousins, 1993).
Separation and Control of Variables
Control of variables is a complex reasoning pattern or strategy which 
may involve several other simpler reasoning schemes. It is a result of a 
long developmental process and is reached during the formal reasoning 
phase. During an early developmental phase, children learn to identify 
the key components of a system (e.g., the string and the ball in a pendu-
lum), associate variables with them (e.g., length and weight), and differ-
entiate between the values of the variables (e.g., short, long; light, heavy). 
Investigating the connection between the variables, and determining their 
dependencies requires systematic manipulation of the variables, changing 
their values and observing their effects on the others. Control of variables 
is essential in designing scientifi c experiments, organising and interpret-
ing results of observations.
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Advancing Cognitive Development through 
Science Education
In the last section we described in some detail a set of thinking abilities 
which are important in science – but in the fi rst section we intimated that 
scientifi c thinking is rooted in general thinking ability, and that the de-
velopment of one is likely to transfer to the other. Now we must address 
the question of by what mechanism can students’ scientifi c reasoning 
(and by extension all of their reasoning) be stimulated? We have made it 
clear that we do not subscribe to a ‘fi xed intelligence’ viewpoint, but 
believe in (and have good evidence for) a model of general and specifi c 
thinking that is amenable to educational infl uence. On the Learning-De-
velopment spectrum introduced in a previous section, reasoning falls 
nearer to the Development-end. In other words it is more developmental, 
and more general than a simple learning task and we should not expect 
that scientifi c reasoning (for example the thinking abilities described in 
the last section) could be taught in a direct instructional manner. Any at-
tempt to ‘teach’ them as a set of rules to be followed is doomed to failure. 
The student may memorise the rules but fail to internalise them, to make 
them his/her own, and it will mean that s/he will be lost when trying to 
apply the rules. The development of scientifi c reasoning, as with the 
development of any reasoning, must necessarily be a slow and organ ic 
process in which the students construct the reasoning for themselves. 
We now need to say more about what the teacher can do to facilitate 
this process of construction. We will exemplify the general principles 
with reference to one particular approach, that of Cognitive Acceleration 
through Science Education (CASE), and then conclude this section by 
mentioning briefl y how similar principles are employed by a number of 
other successful programmes for the teaching of thinking. CASE is chosen 
as the prime exemplar since it has been well-established over a period of 
20 years originating from a science context, and has published many 
examples demonstrating the effectiveness of its approach (Adey, Robert-
son, & Venville, 2002; Adey & Shayer, 1993, 1994; Shayer, 1999; Shayer 
& Adey, 2002). 
CASE pedagogy is founded in the developmental psychologies of Jean 
Piaget (1896-1980) and Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934). Whilst they had ar-
guments over some important issues during their lifetime (such as the 
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primacy of language over development or development over language), 
they agreed about many things, notably:
(1) the impact of the environment on cognitive development;
(2) the at least equal importance of the social as well as the physical 
environment;
(3) the value to children’s development of becoming conscious of their 
own thinking processes, conscious of themselves as thinkers. 
These three principles are the basis of what are called the ‘pillars’ of 
cognitive acceleration. Firstly, the specifi c nature of a stimulating envi-
ronment is one that is challenging, one that goes beyond what an indi-
vidual is currently capable of, one that requires intellectual effort to 
tackle. In Piagetian terms this would be called Cognitive Confl ict, and 
for Vygotsky it is working within the Zone of Proximal Development – 
the difference between what a child can do unaided and what they can 
achieve with the support of a teacher or more able peer. According to 
Vygotsky, the only good learning is that which is in advance of develop-
ment (Vygotsky, 1978). The task for the teacher, which is not trivial, is 
to maintain just the right degree of tension between what her students 
can manage easily and what they will be incapable of at this stage, no 
matter what support they receive. This task is made even more diffi cult 
when, as is usual, a class contain students of a wide range of cognitive 
levels. An activity which offers cognitive confl ict for one student may 
seem trivial to another, and impossibly diffi cult to a third. Activities 
which are generative of cognitive stimulation for classroom use must 
have a variety of entry points and an increasing slope of diffi culty so that 
all can make a start, and all encounter some challenge along the way. 
Secondly, lessons which promote scientifi c reasoning provide plenty 
of opportunities for social construction. That is, they encourage students 
to talk meaningfully to one another, to propose ideas, to justify them, and 
to challenge others in a reasonable manner. A stimulating classroom is 
characterised by high-quality dialogue, modelled and orchestrated by the 
teacher. Those students who are just a few steps ahead of their peers may 
be especially effi cient helping the others as they think in similar way and 
are sensitive to the obstacles of understanding. 
Thirdly, classrooms in which reasoning is being developed are refl ec-
tive places. Students and the teacher look back on the thinking they have 
developed and refl ect on successes and failures, so that the lessons of the 
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development of a particular reasoning strand can be learnt and trans-
ferred to future ‘thinking’ lessons. Metacognition encourages the abstrac-
tion of general reasoning principles which can subsequently be applied 
to new types of reasoning.
In cognitive acceleration these three core ‘pillars’ were originally in-
corporated into a set of 30 activities aimed at junior secondary students 
aged 11–14 years (Adey, Shayer, & Yates, 2001) but the principles have 
now been applied to a younger range of children (Adey, 1998; Adey, 
Nagy, Robertson, Serret, & Wadsworth, 2003; Adey, Robertson, & Ven-
ville, 2001). In all cases, schemata of reasoning such as those described 
in the last section form the ‘subject matter’ of the activities. For example, 
starting with the schema of classifi cation, in one activity students aged 
about 7 years are presented in their groups with a collection of seed-like 
objects including an apple pip, sunfl ower seeds, a rice grain, small glass 
beads, lentils, raisins and so on. They are asked to study them and say 
which are seeds and which are not. Making piles of seeds and not-seeds 
is easy enough but now they are asked to justify their choices. This leads 
to much discussion, carefully led in an open-ended manner by the teacher, 
generating cognitive confl ict as the class struggles together towards some 
set of features by which a seed can be distinguished from a non-seed.
With the youngest children such activities are given about 30 minutes 
every week, while with the 7 to 9 year olds perhaps activities last an 
hour and are given once every two weeks over two years. Evaluations 
(Adey et al., 2002; Shayer & Adey, 2002; Shayer & Adhami, 2011; Ven-
ville, Adey, Larkin, & Robertson, 2003) show that such intervention has 
long term effects on the development of children’s reasoning which 
transfers to gains in achievement in academic subject areas. 
Other programmes which have reported signifi cant effects on child-
ren’s reasoning include Philosophy for Children (Lipman, Sharp, & Os-
canyan, 1980; Topping & Trickey, 2007a, 2007b). Although this training 
does not have a particular focus on science, the classroom methods ap-
plied in this program (interaction between students, discussion, argumen-
tation) may be useful in science education as well. Similarly, science-
related philosophical questions may be discussed in this way; further-
more students’ attitudes, beliefs and personal epistemologies may be ef-
fi ciently formed by this approach. (For the Hungarian adaptation of the 
Philosophy for Children program, see G. Havas, Demeter, & Falus, 1998.)
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Another training method for fostering thinking relevant to the education 
of sciences is Klauer’s Inductive Reasoning Program (Klauer, 1989, 1996; 
Klauer & Phye, 1994, 2008). Originally, the program applied a toolkit 
designed on the basis of Klauer’s model of inductive reasoning (Klauer, 
1998b). It proved to be especially effective with young slow-developing 
students. Later these principles of development were applied both outside 
the particular school subjects and embedded into them. In a recent exper-
iment, based on Klauer’s original model, Molnár (2011) reported success-
ful fostering of inductive reasoning in young children by using playful 
but well-structured activities. In a current article, Klauer and Phye (2008) 
reviewed 74 developmental studies which aimed at improving inductive 
reasoning. Most of the interventions took place in the framework of 
school subjects, including mathematics, biology, geography, and physics.
Several further experiments demonstrated that science education offers 
excellent opportunities for fostering thinking abilities. Among others, 
Csapó (1992, 2003) reported signifi cant improvements in combinatorial 
reasoning as a result of training embedded in physics and chemistry. 
Nagy (2006) described an experiment aiming at fostering analogical 
reasoning in biology that not only improved analogical reasoning but 
resulted in better understanding and mastery of biology content as well. 
Beyond the experimental works and intervention studies, this approach 
– embedding developmental effects into the delivery of science content – 
may be applied in regular everyday teaching as well. For example, Záto nyi 
(2001) proposes a number of particular activities for physics education 
which may serve multiple aims, fostering thinking abilities and a better 
mastering of the content.
There are several teaching methods which are especially favourable 
for the advancement of thinking. A recent movement promoting Inquiry 
Based Science Education1 (IBSE) proposes more observations and ex-
periments in science education. Problem Based Learning (PBL) organ-
ises teaching materials around realistic issues, often cutting across disci-
plinary borders, which indicate the relevance of learning specifi c pieces 
of information. Dealing with complex problems is not only more chal-
 1 IBSE is the model that is supported by European Federation of National Academies of Sciences 
and Humanities and its Working Group Science Education, see: http://www.allea.org/Pages/
ALL/19/243.bGFuZz1FTkc.html. A number of European Commission projects deals with IBSE 
as well.
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lenging but more motivating for young learners as well, compared to the 
often sterile materials organised by the disciplinary logic. Project work 
also requires more activities fostering thinking, and helps to integrate 
knowledge into context. Group projects especially foster communication 
skills and group problem solving.
Assessing Cognitive Development in Science Education
Assessing reasoning requires tools and methods different from that of 
assessing how well students learnt content knowledge. The main problem 
is that assessing thinking always requires content and the familiarity of 
content may infl uence the related reasoning and the solution itself. Piaget 
faced a similar diffi culty when he studied children’s reasoning processes. 
Therefore, he applied a method of questioning the students – the clinical 
method – which provided most of the information needed by the exam-
ined child so focusing the test on the ability to use and process informa-
tion. A similar problem has to be solved when assessing thinking: the 
infl uence of the content should be minimised.
Content of Assessment
When we are assessing science reasoning, we are by defi nition not as-
sessing science knowledge, even science conceptual knowledge. The 
task therefore becomes one of trying to measure a student’s ability to 
reason scientifi cally while making the least possible demands on their 
content knowledge. If an item confounds knowledge and reasoning and 
a student fails, we do not know whether that failure represents a lack of 
knowledge or inadequate reasoning powers. While it is probably impos-
sible for a reasoning item to demand no knowledge at all (or indeed for 
a knowledge item to require no reasoning at all), that at least is the ideal 
to strive for. What knowledge is needed should be provided. For exam-
ple, if we wish to assess a young child’s ability to conserve liquid vol-
ume across change of shape we might present an item such as the one on 
Figure 1.1.
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Here are two glasses A and B. They are just the same as each other. Both 
glasses contain the same amount of apple juice.
 A B
Do you agree?
Here is another glass C, taller and thinner than the glass A or B. It is 
empty.
 A B C
Now the apple juice from glass B is poured into the tall, thin glass C.
 A B C
[This to be done in reality, or on a video / computer]
Look at the apple juice left in glass A, and the apple juice now in the tall 
glass C.
Remember, we started with the same amounts in glasses A and B. Then 
we poured all the juice from B to the thin glass C. Is there now:
 More juice in C than A, or
 More juice in A than C, or
 The same amount of juice in A and C?
What makes you think so?
If you were offered glass A or C to drink, which one would you choose?
Why?
Figure 1.1 
Testing volume conservation
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Below we will consider how items such as this may be administered. 
Here we will focus further on what sort of reasoning it is that we should 
be trying to assess. The criteria we will propose within the context of this 
chapter on science reasoning are that the matter to be assessed should 
relate to science, but should also relate to general reasoning. Further-
more it should be appropriate for children aged 6 to 12 years. The cate-
gories of reasoning from previous sections of this chapter which fi t these 
criteria are what we described there as the thinking abilities or schemata 
of concrete operations and some of the schemata of formal operations. 
Specifi cally, we would include the following operations:
q(1) conservations including number, matter (mass), weight, volume of 
liquid and displaced volume;
q(2) seriation including putting things in order by one variable then re-
ordering by a second variable and interpolating new objects into a 
series;
q(3) classifi cation including simple grouping, grouping by two variables, 
‘missing’ groups, overlapping classes and hierarchies;
q(4) cause and effect including more than one cause of one effect and 
more than one effect of one cause, the distinction from simple cor-
relation, but not weighting multiple causes or probabilities; includ-
ing fi nding simple qualitative relationships between variables;
q(5) combinatorial thinking and fi nding combinations of up to three (or 
four?) variables each with two or three values;
q(6) understanding a basic conception of probability and distinguishing 
events with lower or higher probability;
q(7) basic correlative reasoning, the ability to recognise the correlation 
based on the proportion of events strengthening and weakening the 
relationship;
q(8) spatial perception including perspective and mental rotation;
q(9) speed in terms of distance and time;
(10)  control of variables in three variable situations where each variable 
is directly observable;
(11) ratios of small whole numbers.
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Forms of Assessing Reasoning Abilities
As indicated earlier, items assessing scientifi c reasoning need to be as free 
as possible from demands for scientifi c knowledge, and all required 
knowledge should be provided. The exercise of these aspects of scien-
tifi c reasoning often requires that each item presents a series of scenarios 
with the response of the student at each step being observed. This ap-
proach is closely related to the principle of dynamic assessment (Tzuriel, 
1998) in which what is observed is the subject’s ability to learn from 
experience rather than their crystallised knowledge. There is a similar 
situation in the assessment of dynamic problem solving (Greiff & Funke, 
2010), when students interact with a system presented by a computer, 
observe the behaviour of the system, generalise the observed rules, and 
then use this knowledge to solve the given problem. A similar interaction 
may help to activate students’ thinking that then may be recorded by a 
computer.
For a long time, this type of testing could most reliably be managed by 
an individual interview and this is the basis of Piaget’s clinical method. 
But such an interview is not a very practical approach for a classroom 
teacher who wishes to assess her children’s current reasoning capability, 
nor for an education authority interested in school, regional, or national 
norms. In scaling up a testing method from the one-on-one assessment 
by a psychologist to a classroom test that can be administered by a non-
specialist, some compromises of validity are inevitable. On the other 
hand, computerised testing can be much closer to the ideal individual 
interview than a paper-and-pencil assessment. Furthermore, administering 
the same test to every subject improves the objectivity of the assessment.
One successful example of the development of classroom tasks for 
assessing levels of cognitive development was the Science Reasoning 
Tasks of Shayer et al. in the 1970s (Shayer, 1970; Shayer, Adey, & Wylam, 
1981). Most of the tasks developed were aimed at assessing formal oper-
ations (control and exclusion of variables, equilibrium, probability, com-
binations) but two were targeted at younger students:
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(1)  Volume and heaviness covers simple volume conservation up to 
density concepts in the Piagetian range from early concrete opera-
tions to early formal operations. The administrator demonstrates 
various actions (pouring liquids, lowering a mass into water in a 
measuring cylinder, etc.) and takes the class through the items one 
by one, explaining as necessary. Students answer on a sheet requir-
ing multiple choice or short written answers. This task is suitable 
for students aged from 8 years upwards. 
(2)  Spatial perception is a drawing task. In one set of items students 
are required to predict the level of water in a jar as it is tilted (ac-
tual jars with water being demonstrated) and in others they are 
invited to draw a mountain, with a house on the side, then a chim-
ney, then smoke from the chimney, also an avenue of trees going 
away. This task covers the range from early pre-operational to ma-
ture concrete operations and can be used with children as young as 
5 years. 
Even these assessment tasks are open to errors in administration and 
they do require some particular pieces of equipment for demonstration. 
The best promise for the future of assessment of reasoning including 
science reasoning, is the administration of tasks similar to those de-
scribed above but using a computer to present the situations, to ask the 
questions, and even to modify the progress of the test in the light of an 
individual student’s responses by applying the principles of adaptive 
testing. This approach begins to become possible when all students in a 
class have access to computers. As handling computers is getting easier 
and simpler, this promise may be realised soon. We will outline what one 
such test task might look like on Figure 1.2, taking the schema of classi-
fi c ation as an example. 
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1  The first item screen presents an array of 4 green squares and 4 green 
triangles of similar size. 
 
The instruction, delivered as text and by audio, is “Can you sort out 
these shapes? Drag them into two groups so all the shapes in each 
group are the same”.
2  Array of green squares, triangles, circles. 
 “Divide these into three groups of similar objects.”
3a  A mixture of green and red squares, green and red triangles. 
“Make two groups so all the shapes in each group have at least one 
thing in common. What feature have you used to make your groups? 
Colour / Shape / Size / other?”
3b  “Mix them up again and then divide them into two groups in a different 
way. What feature have you used this time? Colour / Shape / Size / 
other?”
3c  “Now divide them into four groups. What are the features of the shapes 
in each group?”

Figure 1.2
Classifi cation task
Items can be added of increasing diffi culty by increasing the number 
of variables, the number of values of each variable, by introducing emp-
ty sets (e.g., an array of red circles, red squares, blue circles), by intro-
ducing hierarchical classifi cation, and by moving to real-life examples 
(e.g., farm animals). The programme would record the student’s answers, 
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assess competence in classifying at each level, offer more diffi cult items 
following success or simpler items following repeated failure, and yield 
an overall level of performance. 
It should be possible to develop tests of this sort for each of the sche-
mata. The question then arises, ‘could just one test be developed which 
tested levels in all or many of the schemata?’ One might have, for exam-
ple, four items relating to classifi cation, another four to conservation, 
more to do with causality and so on.
There are a number of reasons why such an approach may cause prob-
lems. Firstly, within each schema there are many levels of access which 
cannot be sampled adequately with three or four items. Secondly, in line 
with the relationship of this type of test with dynamic assessment, it 
takes a little time for subjects to ‘tune in’ to the topic of the test. To con-
tinually jump from one schema to another is liable to lead to an underes-
timation of a child’s true ability as they have to ‘re-tune’ to each new 
short set of questions. Finally, although the developmental progress 
through each schema can be mapped on to and is underpinned by a com-
mon scale of cognitive development, and one might expect a child to 
progress through each of the schemata more or less in synchrony, in fact, 
variations in experience lead to what Piaget called decalage – progress 
through one schema not keeping precisely in step with others.
For diagnostic purposes it is useful to have a profi le of a child’s devel-
opmental level separately in each of the aspects of science reasoning. 
This requires a large number of specifi cally prepared individual tasks. If 
students are systematically and regularly assessed by computer, and the 
results of the previous assessments are available before every testing se s-
sion, the assessment may be customised for the actual developmental 
level of each student.
Interpretation of Assessments, Results, Strengths 
and Risks of Schemata Tests
Tests of science reasoning can yield valuable information at various le-
vels. For an individual teacher, to see at fi rst hand the responses of her 
pupils to a reasoning task can be quite surprising and enlightening and 
often elicits responses such as “I can’t believe they got that ‘wrong’” or 
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“But I only taught them that two weeks ago”. Such reactions may be 
attributed to the fact that the nature of cognitive development and the 
relationship of teaching to development are often poorly understood by 
teachers and the results of reasoning tests can reveal that the develop-
ment of reasoning such as control of variables or proportional thinking is 
slower than one might think, and is not amenable to simple direct in-
struction. Certainly, teachers can help students develop this reasoning 
but it is a slow process of cognitive stimulation in various contexts rather 
than a matter of simple instruction alone.
Once they overcome the urge to ‘teach’ the reasoning skills directly, 
teachers will fi nd the results of reasoning tests useful to inform them of 
where children are now so that they can (a) map out the long road of 
cognitive stimulation ahead and (b) better judge what type of activities 
are likely to cause useful cognitive confl ict – both for a class as a whole 
and for individual children.
On a larger scale, some national (Shayer, Küchemann, & Wylam, 1976; 
Shayer & Wylam, 1978) and international (Shayer, Demetriou, & Pervez, 
1988) norms have been established for the ages of attainment of various 
levels of development which could allow a teacher, school, or education 
authority to make some judgement about the performance of their stu-
dents compared with a wider context. Unfortunately, many of these 
norms are now quite old and it has been shown that the norms for, for 
example, the Volume and Heaviness task describe above have changed 
radically since they were fi rst established in the 1970s (Shayer & Ginsburg, 
2009). In spite of this shift, both by internal comparisons within a school 
and simply by reference to the transparent success criteria that these 
tests display, it would be possible even from localised testing to identify 
individual students who may appear to have some science reasoning 
disability, as well as exceptional students who might benefit from 
higher-level stimulation than is provided by the regular school curricu-
lum.
The advantage of the type of test that has been discussed in this chapter 
is that it assesses something more fundamental than science knowledge 
or understanding. What is assessed has a strong developmental component, 
is an indicator of general reasoning ability, and underlies all effective 
lear ning. By improving the quality of assessment of science reasoning 
we gain a deeper insight into how our students are thinking scientifi c ally 
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and so are better able to help them through targeted cognitive stimulation 
to develop their thinking further and so provide them with the tools they 
need to improve all of their science learning.
But there are some features of science reasoning tests which need 
attent ion if their main purpose is not to be thwarted. Firstly, there is a 
small risk that some people might interpret the score from a reasoning 
test as a more or less fi xed property of the child. Guidance on the use of 
the tests needs to make clear that even if the reasoning being tested is not 
easily amenable to direct instruction, it certainly is amenable to longer 
term, developmentally conscious teaching. It should be emphasised that 
the purpose of such a testing is to identify the need for intervention and 
to monitor the effects of the treatment. Science reasoning tests can be 
used in a formative way as well as can science knowledge tests. Further-
more, it is essential in computerised testing to apply realistic situations. 
Students should feel the objects and processes presented on the screen as 
real, otherwise they cannot make a correspondence between the real 
world and the one presented by the computer.
Secondly, there is the issue of test development through drafting, trial-
ling and item statistics; re-drafting and programming the instruments for 
computer delivery. As indicated previously we see these tests being best 
administered one-on-one by individual computers. This is essentially a 
technical problem. 
Finally, there is an issue about security, especially in systems with 
high-stakes testing. If the developed tests were to become freely availa-
ble, and if the diagnostic purpose of the tests was misunderstood, they 
would be prone to coaching. That is, a school or teacher who obtained 
the tests and thought that there was some merit in being able to report 
that their students scored highly on the tests (for example in a prospectus 
to parents) could relatively easily coach students with ‘correct’ answers. 
This process short-circuits real developmental growth and the artifi cially 
infl ated scores would not refl ect genuine internalisation of the schemata 
by the students. The best guard against such misuse is education of teach-
ers and school principals, and a policy of discouraging the public report-
ing of test scores of individuals or groups. The temptation of ‘teaching 
for testing’ or ‘test coaching’ may be further reduced if testing is regu-
larly repeated, and the data are longitudinally connected. Artifi cially rais-
ing the results at one assessment point would decrease the possibility of 
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having a gain in the consecutive assessments. Furthermore, in the case of 
longitudinally connected developmental data, manipulation of results 
may be more easily identifi ed with statistical methods.
This raises also the issue of how such test results should be reported 
to students themselves. As is normal good formative assessment practice 
(Black, Harrison, Lee, Marshall, & Wiliam, 2003), feedback should be 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Simply giving a student a total score 
on a reasoning task is meaningless since it does not tell him or her sort 
of thinking at which s/he has been successful, and the sort of thinking 
that still needs to be developed. An effi cient formative feedback, fi rst of 
all, should advise students to fi nd activities which help them to further 
develop and to improve the results. The test scores can only help them to 
control if their work has been effi cient, and how it has increased since 
the last assessment. In a classroom, setting group feedback can actually 
become a teaching opportunity, as different students are invited to report 
their choices of answers and to justify them and engage in social con -
s truction with others. 
Summary
In this chapter we have made a clear distinction between science knowl-
edge and science reasoning, this distinction being partly clarifi ed by their 
positions on a Learning-Development spectrum, which has implications 
for their degree of generality. As a consequence of this distinction, we 
also have to distinguish direct teaching and systematic stimulation of the 
development. This latter one is the process of improving scientifi c reason-
ing as well as fostering thinking in general.
We have seen some ways in which science reasoning may be classifi ed 
and have paid particular attention to the set of scientifi c reasoning pat-
terns or schemata which underpin all science learning and understanding. 
Science reasoning is seen as one aspect of general reasoning, or general 
intelligence, and both general and science reasoning are open to develop-
ment through appropriate educational experiences.
We have described the nature of cognitively stimulating experience as 
typically involving cognitive confl ict that challenges students’ actual 
knowledge and motivates them to step further towards a higher level of 
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understanding. We have highlighted the importance of social construction, 
the processes in which students dispute and argue over science phenom-
ena mutually inspiring each others’ reasoning processes. Furthermore, 
we emphasised the role of metacognition and the signifi cance of becoming 
a conscious thinker being able to control and monitor our own reasoning 
processes. We have demonstrated the unique opportunities science edu-
cation may offer to exercise all these essential cognitive processes.
Finally, methods of assessing students’ powers of reasoning in science 
have been introduced. We also have provided some pointers and criteria 
from which it might be possible to start to develop banks of appropriate 
test items. The uses and potential misuses of such tests have been consid e-
red.
Formative and diagnostic assessment of scientifi c reasoning has already 
been explored in experimental educational programs for several decades. 
However, the demands of human and instrumental resources required for 
the assessment of students’ reasoning prevented these methods from being 
broadly applied in everyday educational practice. Technology-based assess-
ment makes personalised testing accessible in average classrooms and in 
this way helps to take a further step towards adjusting science education 
to the actual developmental level and individual needs of students.
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